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Military Commissions Are Governed by Military
and International Law: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
MILITARY COMMISSIONS - EXECUTIVE POWER - INTERNATIONAL
LAW - FEDERAL JURISDICTION - HABEAS CORPUS - WAR AND

NATIONAL EMERGENCY - The Supreme Court of the United States

held that military commission procedures to try Guantanamo Bay
detainees must be consistent with both court-martial proceedings
and the Geneva Conventions, insofar as practicable.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).

Petitioner, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Guantanamo Bay detainee,
was granted habeas corpus relief in a federal court on the grounds
that the procedures of the military commission by which he was
being tried were illegal.' Respondent, the United States Government, won on appeal, and the United States Supreme Court
2
granted certiorari to decide the issue.
In November 2001, Hamdan was captured by militia forces in
Afghanistan and turned over to United States Armed Forces for
his suspected connection to the terrorist group al Qaeda. 3 On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush issued an executive
order authorizing trial by military commission for non-citizens
4
alleged to have terrorist ties.

1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2761-62 (2006). A writ of habeas corpus is
commonly filed in order to bring a party in front of a court to determine the legality of a
party's imprisonment or detention. BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).
2. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762.
3. Id. at 2759-60. After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing
the President to use any necessary means and appropriate force against "those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks." Id. at 2760 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.
107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001)).
4. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). The military order stated that any person
subject to the order, including members of al Qaeda, shall "be tried by [a] military commission for any and all offenses triable by [a] military commission that such individual is alleged to have committed." Id. at 57834(4)(a). In June 2002, Hamdan was transported to an
American naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he awaited charges. Hamdan, 126
S. Ct. at 2759. Over a year later, the President declared that Hamdan and five other detainees were subject to the order. Id. at 2760. Military counsel was appointed to represent
Hamdan in December 2003, for still unspecified charges. Id. Two months later, counsel
filed demands for charges and for a speedy trial; the applications were denied. Id.
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While the military tribunal was underway, Hamdan filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington. 5
After the writs were filed, the Government formally charged
Hamdan with conspiracy. 6 Meanwhile, a Combatant Status Review Tribunal decided that Hamdan's continued detention at
Guantanamo Bay was justified, and proceedings before the mili7
tary commission began.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted Hamdan's petition for habeas corpus while staying the
military commission's proceedings. 8 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed the district court, finding that the
Geneva Conventions were not enforceable, Hamdan was not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions, and abstention
was inappropriate. 9
Hamdan submitted a petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted to decide: (1) whether
the military commission convened to try Hamdan was authorized
to do so, and (2) whether Hamdan may rely upon the Geneva Conventions.1 0 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding
5. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759.
6. Id. at 2960-61. After the Government charged Hamdan, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington transferred the writs to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 2761.
7. Id. at 2761.
8. Id. The district court found that the President may establish military commissions
only to try offenses that are against the laws of war, that Hamdan was subject to the protections provided by the Geneva Conventions, and that the military commission violated
both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions. Id.
The UCMJ is a model code governing military justice proceedings. 10 U.S.C. § 801
(1989). The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are "four international agreements dealing with
the protection of wounded members of the armed forces, the treatment of prisoners of war,
and the protection of civilians during international armed conflicts." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 707 (8th ed. 2004).
9. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
10. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762. On December 30, 2005, a little over a month after the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Hamdan's case, Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA). Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739. Two months
later, the Government filed a motion to dismiss the certiorari based on lack of jurisdiction
under the DTA. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762. The Court found that the DTA did not repeal
the Court's jurisdiction, and denied the Government's motion to dismiss. Id. at 2769. The
Court, relying on Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), found that under ordinary principles of statutory construction, a negative inference may be drawn from Congress' failure to
include § 1005(e)(1) of the DTA within the scope of § 1005(h)(2) of the DTA. Hamdan, 126
S. Ct. at 2764-65. Additionally, the Court found that the legislative history showed that
Congress intentionally excluded paragraph (1) from the scope of § 1005(h)(2). Id. at 2769.
The Court also rejected the Government's argument that it should rely upon the principle
that civilian courts should await the final outcome of ongoing military proceedings before
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that the military commission may not proceed because its structure and procedure violated both the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) and the four Geneva Conventions signed in
1949.11
The commission's procedures denied Hamdan the right to be
present at trial, allowing him to be convicted on evidence that he
had neither seen nor heard.12 The procedures also barred Hamdan and his attorney from viewing evidence used against Hamdan, and prohibited Hamdan's attorney from discussing certain
evidence with him. 13 Additionally, the procedures allowed any
evidence that had probative value to a reasonable person to be
admitted, including hearsay and unsworn live testimony. 14 Finally, the procedures required that appeals be heard exclusively
by the Executive Branch. 15
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. 16 The majority found that the UCMJ required the procedures of military
commissions to be the same as those in court-martial and criminal
proceedings insofar as practicable.17 The procedures of Hamdan's
staying those proceedings. Id. The Court found that the ruling in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), the decision upon which the Government's argument relied,
applied only to military discipline involving service members, and not to Hamdan. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2770. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
11. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798.
12. Id. at 2786.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2787.
16. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2758. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. Chief Justice Roberts did not participate. Id. Justice
Kennedy did not join in Parts V and VI-D-iv. Id. (plurality opinion). Justice Breyer filed a
concurring opinion in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Hamdan, 126
S. Ct. at 2758. Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion in which Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in Parts I and II. Id. Justice Scalia authored a dissenting
opinion in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined. Id. Justice Thomas also wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Scalia joined, and Justice Alito joined except as to Parts I,
II-C-i, and III-B-ii. Id. Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Scalia
and Thomas joined in Parts I-III. Id.
Article 2 of the UCMJ states: "(a) The following persons are subject to [the UCMJ]
(12)

. . . persons within an area leased by . . . the United States."

10 U.S.C. §

802(a)(12)(1989). The Court found that Hamdan was subject to the provisions of the UCMJ
because he was detained at Guantanamo Bay, an area leased by the United States. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2789 n.47.
17. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790. Article 36 of the UCMJ states:
(a) . . . procedures, including modes of proof, for cases . . . triable in courts-

martial .... military commissions and other military tribunals... may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts ....
10 U.S.C. § 836(a).
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trial deviated substantially from those of a court-martial proceeding. 18 The Court also found that the Government offered no evidence suggesting that uniform court-martial procedures were impracticable, justifying the commission's deviation. 19 Therefore,
the Court concluded the military commission's procedures were
illegal.20
Disagreeing with the decision of the court of appeals, Justice
Stevens found that Hamdan was entitled to the protections of the
Geneva Conventions and that the military commission procedures
were in violation of Article 3 of that treaty (hereinafter "Common
Article 3").21 The court of appeals agreed with the Government
that the Geneva Conventions were not applicable in this case because the conflict in which Hamdan was captured was between
22
the United States and al Qaeda and not between nation-states.
Overruling the court of appeals, the Supreme Court found that,
even if the conflict was not characterized as "international," Hamdan was entitled to the protections of Common Article 3, which
provides protections to individuals captured in non-international

conflicts. 23
The majority interpreted the phrase "all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" in
Common Article 3 to be the same judicial guarantees provided by
24
an ordinary court-martial proceeding governed by the UCMJ.
Justice Stevens concluded that, because the procedures of the
military commission deviated from the procedures of an ordinary
court-martial, the commission was in violation of the Geneva Con25
ventions.

18. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790.
19. Id. at 2792.
20. Id. at 2793.
21. Id. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (hereinafter "Common Article 3") . Common
Article 3 prohibits "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." Id.
22. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794-95. See Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Article 2
of the Geneva Conventions renders the full protections applicable only to "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties." Id. at 3518. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
23. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795-96. Common Article 3 applies to non-combatants,
combatants who have put down their arms, and combatants who are unable to fight due to
wounds or detention. Common Article 3, supra note 21, at 3320.
24. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
25. Id. at 2798.
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In Part V of the opinion, the Court addressed Hamdan's conspiracy charge and found that conspiracy was not a crime triable
by a military commission. 26 The Court examined the history of
the common law governing military commissions and reasoned
that alleged offenses must have been committed both in a theater
of war and during the conflict. 2 7 Hamdan was charged with conspiracy for acts related to terrorist activity occurring before the
conflict between the United States and al Qaeda began. 28 Additionally, the crime of conspiracy was not recognized by any international sources as a war crime. 29 For these reasons, the Court
found that the charge of conspiracy was not triable by a military
30
commission.
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion which further discussed the history of the common law of war, agreeing with the
Court that the military commission violated the UCMJ. 3 1 Having
reached this initial conclusion, Justice Kennedy found no reason
to address whether Common Article 3 necessarily required that
26. Id. at 2785 (plurality opinion). The opinion in Part V was a plurality opinion
agreed upon by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer; Justice Kennedy did not
join. Id. at 2758 (majority opinion).
27. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777 (plurality opinion). See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1
(1945); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Ex parte
Vallandingham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863); G. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 308 (rev. 3d ed. 1915); WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 831 (rev. 2d ed. 1920).
28. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761 (plurality opinion). Paragraph 12 of Hamdan's official
charge stated "from on or about February 1996 to on or about November 24, 2001," Hamdan "willfully and knowingly joined an enterprise of persons who shared a common criminal purpose." Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184). There
were four specific acts listed in paragraph 13 of Hamdan's official charge:
(1) he acted as Osama bin Laden's "bodyguard and personal driver," "believ[ing]" all the while that bin Laden "and his associates were involved in" terrorist acts prior to and including the attacks on September 11, 2001; (2) he arranged for the transportation of, and actually transported, weapons used by al
Qaeda members and by bin Laden's bodyguards (Hamdan among them); (3) he
"drove or accompanied [O]sama bin Laden to various al Qaeda-sponsored training camps, press conferences, or lectures," at which bin Laden encouraged attacks against Americans; and (4) he received weapons training at al Qaedasponsored camps.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761 (plurality opinion) (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184)). See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
29. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2784-85 (plurality opinion).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in Parts I and II. Id. Justice
Breyer also wrote a brief concurring opinion in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Id. Justice Breyer emphasized the importance of checks on presidential
power, stating that "[t]he Court's conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the Executive a 'blank check."' Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
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the accused be present at all stages of a military commission. 32
For these reasons, Justice Kennedy also found it unnecessary to
33
address the validity of the conspiracy charge against Hamdan.
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he disagreed with the Court's rationale on the merits. 34 Justice Thomas
found that the Court ignored common law precedent and that the
President should decide the scope of war crimes.3 5 Justice Thomas also argued that Hamdan's affiliation with al Qaeda, an organization whose purpose was to violate laws, was enough to constitute an offense triable by a military commission. 36 Additionally, Justice Thomas found that Article 36 of the UCMJ should
have been interpreted as giving the President latitude in establishing military commissions, and not as a restriction on the
President requiring him to explain his reasons for their establishment. 3 7 Finally, Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority
and agreed with the reasoning of the court of appeals regarding
the inapplicability and unenforceability of the Geneva Conven38
tions.
Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion in which he found no
reason to agree with the Court's decision that a "regularly constituted court," as required by Common Article 3, necessarily needed
to be of the exact structure and composition as a court-martial
proceeding. 39 Justice Alito also found too severe the majority's
classification of the military commission as illegal due to the possibility of improper procedures. 40 In his conclusion, Justice Alito
32. Id. at 2808-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 2809.
34. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined, and
Justice Alito joined in all but Parts I, II-C-1, and III-B-2. Id. Justice Scalia also wrote a
dissenting opinion in which he disputed the Court's determination that the DTA did not
deprive it of jurisdiction. Id. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that
common law precedent required that a statute repealing jurisdiction applies to cases pending at the time the statute takes effect. Id. See Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112
(1952). Additionally, Justice Scalia argued that the Court should not have relied upon the
legislative history of the DTA in making its determination because legislative history has
no precedential value, and Senate floor debates should not be the stuff of which judicial
interpretations are made. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2815 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia also disagreed with the majority regarding abstention, finding no reason to disregard
the common law notion that civilian courts should await the final outcome of ongoing military proceedings before staying those proceedings. Id. at 2819-20.
35. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2826 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2832.
37. Id. at 2842.
38. Id. at 2849.
39. Id. at 2851 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in Parts
I-III. Id. at 2849.
40. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2853 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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agreed that Hamdan is subject to the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions, but did not agree that the military commission was
in violation of them.41
A military commission is a court modeled after a court-martial
42
proceeding that tries cases involving martial-law violations.
Military commissions, like court-martial proceedings, are not part
of the federal judicial system, and are neither mentioned in the
43
United States Constitution nor created by congressional statute.
Instead, military commissions are regulated by articles of war,
44
army regulations, orders of the President, and military custom.
Historically, military commissions have been used in three
situations: (1) to try civilians in occupied enemy territory, or in
territory regained from an enemy where civilian government is
unable to function; (2) as a substitute for civilian courts when
martial law has been declared; and (3) to try enemy combatants
who have violated the laws of war. 45 Military commissions were
first established during the Mexican War. 46 In 1847, General
Winfield Scott, a United States commander of occupied Mexican
territory, ordered a military commission to try American citizens
for ordinary crimes committed in the occupied territory. 47 The
original reason for establishing military commissions to try
American civilians was that there were no civilian courts available
in the occupied territory, and court-martial jurisdiction was lim48
ited to members of the United States Armed Forces.
Less than twenty years later, the Union used military commissions during the Civil War to prosecute pro-Confederate guerillas. 49 Many of the cases tried before these commissions were controversial in the South, due to their highly irregular trial procedures, overzealous prosecutors, and exaggerated sentencing guidelines. 50 One of the most influential Supreme Court decisions on

41. Id. at 2854.
42. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1013 (8th ed. 2004).
43. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773. After Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which governs the procedures of military commissions. See infra note
140.
44. Altmayer v. Sanford, 148 F.2d 161, 162 (5th Cir. 1945).
45. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
46. Id. at 2773 (citing WINTHROP, supra note 27, at 832).
47. Id.
48. See generally DAVIS, supranote 27; WINTHROP, supra note 27.
49. Michal R. Bellknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration'sMilitary Tribunals in HistoricalPerspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433, 452 (2002).
50. Carol Chomsky, The United States - Dakota War Trials:A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REV. 13,59,67-69 (1990). See Exparte Vallandingham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863).
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military commissions during the Civil War was rendered in Ex
51
parte Milligan.
In Milligan, the issue was whether Confederate sympathizers in
Indiana could be tried for conspiracy before military commissions. 52 As tensions heightened between the North and South,
President Abraham Lincoln issued an executive order that allowed
those persons alleged to have rebel ties to be tried before military
commissions; this order resulted in the suspension of habeas corpus for all those arrested. 53 Lambdin Milligan and four others
were accused of conspiring to steal Union weapons and planning
to invade Union prisoner-of-war camps. 54 They were sentenced to
death by a military court in 1864, but their execution was not set
until 1865. 55 They argued their case in front of the United States
Supreme Court after the Civil War ended. 56
Justice Davis, writing for the unanimous Court, determined
that the military commissions were unconstitutional. 57
The
majority found that the military commissions did not have the
jurisdiction to try Milligan because he was a civilian and Indiana
was not in the theater of war. 58 Additionally, the Court found that
the
executive
order
suspending
habeas
corpus
was
unconstitutional because a non-belligerent could not be tried
before a military commission when federal courts were
59
functioning.
51. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
52. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 8. See Justice Frank Sullivan, Jr., Indianapolis Judges and
Lawyers Dramatize Ex Parte Milligan, A Historical Trial of Contemporary Significance, 37
IND. L. REV. 661 (2004).
53. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 4.
54. Sullivan, supranote 52, at 662.
55. Id.
56. Id. Milligan filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court in
Indianapolis. Id. The case was heard by a two-judge panel, and the judges disagreed. Id.
According to the jurisdictional rules at the time, the split allowed the case to be resolved by
the United States Supreme Court. Id.
57. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 107, 122-23.
58. Id.
59. Peter Margulies, Beyond Absolutism: Legal Institutions in the War on Terror, 60 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 309, 322 (2006). In a famous passage, the Milligan Court held:
Certainly no part of the judicial power of the country was conferred on [the
military commission]; because the Constitution expressly vests it "in one supreme court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish," and it is not pretended that the commission was a court
ordained and established by Congress. They cannot justify on the mandate of
the President; because he is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere
of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the laws; and there is "no unwritten
criminal code to which resort can be had as a source of jurisdiction."
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Samuel Chase agreed that the
military commissions did not have jurisdiction but believed that
the lack of jurisdiction was due to the absence of congressional
authorization. 60 Justice Chase argued that it would not violate
the Constitution for Congress to provide for trials by military
commissions of persons accused of conspiracy.61
Despite their contentious character, military commissions
continued to hear cases during World War I ("WWI") and World
War II ("WWII"). 62 Two Supreme Court cases arising from war
crimes committed during WWII, Ex parte Quirin63 and In re
Yamashita,64 outlined the scope of presidential authority to
appoint military commissions. 65 The issue in Quirin, commonly
called the "Nazi Sabateurs" case, was whether the military
commission authorized by President Franklin Roosevelt to try
eight German detainees violated the law of war and the
Constitution. 66
In June 1942, a German submarine left four German men on a
beach in Long Island, New York. 67 Upon landing, the four men,
clad in German Marine Infantry uniforms, stripped off their
uniforms, buried them in the sand, changed into civilian clothing,
and headed towards New York City carrying a supply of
explosives. 68 In Ponte Vedra, Florida, four more German men
came ashore in German Marine Infantry uniforms with explosives
and instructions to bomb Jacksonville, Florida. 69 The eight men
were captured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and on July
2, 1942, President Roosevelt issued an executive order initiating a
military commission to try nationals of foreign enemies caught
entering the United States for the purpose of sabotage. 70 All eight
men were tried and sentenced to death. 71
The condemned men petitioned the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus, which was

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Milligan, 71 U.S. at 141-42 (Chase, J., concurring).
Id.
Bellknap, supra note 49, at 469-72.
317 U.S. 1 (1942).
327 U.S. 1 (1945).
Bellknap, supra note 49, at 469-72.
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 41-44. See Bellknap, supra note 49, at 474.
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denied. 72 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of
whether the military commission violated the laws of war and
unanimously found that the commission was legal. 73 Chief Justice

Stone, who delivered the opinion of the Court, began by carefully
examining the President's power to issue the July 2 order under
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution and the President's executive powers under Article j.74
The majority first found that the Articles of War were an appropriate constitutional exercise of power by Congress.7 5 Specifically,
the Court characterized Article of War 15 as congressional authorization for military commissions, finding the article fully provided for the trial of enemy spies by military tribunal. 76 The
Court concluded that the July 2 order was a valid implementation
of the Articles of War. 77
Counsel for the Germans argued that the Sixth Amendment
guaranteed trial by jury in all cases in which the death penalty
might be applied. 78 The Court disagreed, finding that the Sixth
Amendment was intended to preserve the right to jury in all circumstances where it had been guaranteed by the common law, but
not for military commissions where trial by jury was not a right. 79
Additionally, the majority found that United States citizenship did

72. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18.
73. Id. at 48.
74. Id. at 24-29.
75. Id. at 29. The Articles of War are "the rules and regulations that govern the activities of an army and navy" and are "[t]he body of laws and procedures that governed the
U.S. military until replaced in 1951 by the Uniform Code of Military Justice." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 120 (8th ed. 2004).
76. Matthew Sutter, Bush's Executive Order EstablishingSeptember 11 Military Commissions and the Doctrine of Separation of Powers: Can a Postmodern Vantage Refine the
Discussion?,36 UWLA L. REV. 117 n.45 (2005). After the codification of the UCMJ, Article
of War 15 became Article 21 of the UCMJ. Id.
77. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30. Chief Justice Stone wrote:
By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between... those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants
are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military
forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but
in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for
acts which render their belligerency unlawful.
Id.
78. Id. at 38-46.
79. Id. at 39. The Court noted that military tribunals are "not courts in the sense of
the Judiciary Article... and.., in the natural course of events are usually called upon to
function under conditions precluding resort to [civil] procedures." Id.
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not entitle one of the men, who was a United States citizen, to dif80
ferent treatment under the military commission.
Finally, the Germans argued that the military commission under the July 2 order violated particular procedural requirements
mandated by the Articles of War. 8 ' Specifically, counsel argued
that the secrecy of the proceedings was improper because it would
hamper an appeal.8 2 Although the Court unanimously rejected
this argument, the Justices did not unanimously agree upon a
reason for rejection.83
In summary, the Court held that the charge of violating the
laws of war was one properly tried by military tribunal, that the
July 2 order and the military tribunal organized under it were
constitutional, and that the Germans were not entitled to habeas
84
corpus relief.
Three years later, the Supreme Court once again considered the
legality of military tribunals when it rendered an opinion in the
case of In re Yamashita.8 5 After the Japanese surrendered in
WWII, accused Japanese war criminals were tried by military or
civil courts of individual countries.8 6 General Tomoyuki Yamashita, a commander of Japanese troops in the Philippines, was
charged with failing to supervise his men properly and was prose87
cuted by a United States military commission located there.
Yamashita was served with notice of additional charges relating to
crimes committed under his command on the day his trial began,
but he was denied additional time to prepare his defense against
the new allegations*88
80. Id. at 37. Chief Justice Stone stated, "[clitizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is
unlawful because in violation of the law of war." Id.
81. Id. at 46.
82. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 47.
83. Id. Chief Justice Stone noted:
Some members of the Court are of opinion that Congress did not intend the Articles of War to govern a Presidential military commission convened for the determination of questions relating to admitted enemy invaders and that the context of the Articles makes clear that they should not be construed to apply in
that class of cases. Others are of the view that - even though this trial is subject to whatever provisions of the Articles of War Congress has in terms made
applicable to "commissions" - the particular Articles in question, rightly construed, do not foreclose the procedure prescribed by the President ....
Id.
84. Id. at 48.
85. 327 U.S. 1 (1945).
86. Bellknap, supra note 49, at 449-50.
87. Yamshita, 327 U.S. at 5.
88. Id.
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Yamashita filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands, but the writ was denied.8 9 Like the
German spies in Quirin, Yamashita then filed a petition for habeas corpus with the United States Supreme Court, and certiorari
was granted. 90 Relying heavily on Quirin, the Court held that the
military tribunal was properly constituted and acted under constitutional and legal authority.91
The majority, addressing an unresolved issue in Quirin, found
that the procedural protections set forth in the Articles of War
were not available to enemy combatants, unless they were being
tried for acts committed when they were already prisoners of
war.92 The Court found that Yamashita's status did not entitle
him to any protection under the Articles of War or the Geneva
Convention of 1929, because he was neither a person made subject
to the Articles of War by Article 2, nor a protected prisoner of war
93
being tried for crimes committed during his detention.
Two justices, Justice Murphy and Justice Rutledge, wrote
strong dissents. 9 4 Justice Murphy argued that the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process was universal and applied to enemy combatants. 95 He also argued that the validity of the charge
against Yamashita was supported by neither United States military common law nor international law. 96
In his dissent, Justice Rutledge rejected the Government's argument that deviation from evidentiary rules similar to those used
in court-martial proceedings was justified out of military necessity. 97 He agreed with Justice Murphy that the Fifth Amendment

89. Id. at 6.
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id. at 20. The Court wrote:
By thus recognizing military commissions in order to preserve their traditional
jurisdiction over enemy combatants unimpaired by the Articles [of War], Congress gave sanction, as we held in Ex parte Quirin, to any use of the military
commission contemplated by the common law of war.
Id.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 24.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 28 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 29. Justice Murphy opined:
If we are ever to develop an orderly international community based upon a recognition of human dignity it is of the utmost importance that the necessary
punishment of those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly
stigma of revenge and vindictiveness.

Id.
97.

Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 42-46 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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guarantees applied to Yamashita. 98 Justice Rutledge concluded
his dissent with a quote from Thomas Paine: "[h]e that would
make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent
that will reach to himself."99
Yamashita's trial generated much criticism, and in 1951, Congress passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).100 The
UCMJ governs military law in the United States, and as the title
suggests, the purpose of the code was to make military justice consistent among the armed forces.'10 Article 36 of the UCMJ, entitled "President May Prescribe Rules," governs trial procedures
and provides that the Executive Branch may mandate the rules of
a military commission as long as those rules are consistent with
court-martial proceedings, insofar as practicable, and are not in
violation of other provisions of the UCMJ. 102
More recently, the Supreme Court considered the legality of the
military commissions used to try suspected terrorists belonging to
al Qaeda in Hamdi v.Rumsfeld. 10 3 Hamdi was an American citi10 4
zen whom the Government classified as an "enemy combatant"'
for allegedly taking up arms with the Taliban during the 2001
conflict between the United States and Afghanistan. 10 5 Upon
learning that Hamdi was an American citizen, the Government

98. Id. at 79. Justice Rutledge warned:
Not heretofore has it been held that any human being is beyond its universally
protecting spread in the guaranty of a fair trial in the most fundamental sense.
That door is dangerous to open. I will have no part in opening it. For once it is
ajar, even for enemy belligerents, it can be pushed back wider for others, perhaps ultimately for all.

Id.
99.
100.

Id. at 81.
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 801 (1951).

101. Id.
102. Id. § 836(a).
103. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
104. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. At the time of Hamdi's trial, the term "enemy combatant"
was ambiguous; it was not recognized by domestic or international law and was not defined
in the UCMJ. Joanna Woolman, The Legal Origins of the Term "Enemy Combatant"DoNot
Support Its Present Day Use, 7 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 145, 160 (2005). The term "unlawful enemy combatant" was later defined on October 17, 2006, by the Military Commission
Act of 2006 as being "a person who has engaged in hostilities against the United States or
its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of
the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces.)" Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948(a)(1)(A)(i), 120
Stat. 2600, 2601 (2006).
105. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. The terrorist group al Qaeda attacked the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Id. In response to the attacks, President
George W. Bush ordered United States Armed Forces to invade Afghanistan in order to
subdue the Taliban regime, which had supported al Qaeda. Id.
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transferred him from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to a naval brig in
Charleston, South Carolina. 106
Hamdi's father filed a writ of habeas corpus with the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming
that his son's detention violated his due process rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 107 The
district court ordered production of additional material regarding
Hamdi's status, and the Government petitioned for interlocutory
review. 108 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Quirin,
reversed and remanded. 109 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
0
reversed and remanded. 11
Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, found that the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause required that a citizen held in
the United States as an "enemy combatant" be given a "meaningful opportunity" to contest the factual basis for the detention before a "neutral decision maker." '' Relying on Quirin, the Court
held that the Government may hold a United States citizen as an
"enemy combatant," but decided that the Government may not
112
hold a citizen indefinitely.
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that, based upon legal precedent, the Government had only two options to justify detaining
Hamdi: (1) Congress could suspend the right to habeas corpus, or
(2) Hamdi could be tried under ordinary criminal law.113 In his
dissent, Justice Thomas agreed completely with the Government,
placing great emphasis on the importance of national security dur-

ing times of war. 114
Indeed, national security is imperative during times of war.
Equally essential, however, is maintaining the balance of powers
envisioned by the Constitution.
As Justice Kennedy noted,
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 513-14.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 477 (4th Cir. 2003). The court of appeals wrote:
The privilege of citizenship entitles Hamdi to a limited judicial inquiry into his
detention, but only to determine its legality under the war powers of the political branches. At least where it is undisputed that he was present in a zone of
active combat operations, we are satisfied that the Constitution does not entitle
him to a searching review of the factual determinations underlying his seizure
there.
475.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516.
Id. at 509 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 533.
Id. at 556-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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"[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb."1 15 In codifying the UCMJ, Congress set forth the governing
principles for military courts, and the Hamdan Court correctly
found that the President is bound by them.
Article 36 of the UCMJ outlines the scope of the President's role
in implementing the procedures of Hamdan's military commission. 116 Justice Thomas argued that the proper interpretation of
Article 36 allows the President much latitude in determining what
the procedures of a particular military commission should be, and
that the President was not obligated to explain the necessity for

their implementation. 117
This argument is fundamentally flawed, and the findings of the
majority are more persuasive. If the President is not required to
explain his justification for the implementation of nonstandard
military commission procedures, then Article 36 of the UCMJ is
meaningless. The President could employ procedures wholly different than those prescribed by ordinary criminal trials on the
grounds that he found ordinary procedures impracticable, without
ever having to prove their infeasibility.
Instead, it is more likely that Article 36 requires military commissions to have uniform procedures unless the President can
demonstrate that such procedures are impracticable under the
circumstances. Any other interpretation of the clause ignores the
plain meaning of the statute and the overall intention of the
UCMJ. Even if the Court had interpreted Article 36 to give
greater deference to the President, it would have been hardpressed to find that affording Hamdan the right to be present at
his hearing was impracticable, requiring a deviation in proce118
dure.

115. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
116. 10 U.S.C. § 836(a)(1986). Article 36 of the UCMJ states: "procedures ... for military commissions ... may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far
as he considers practicable,apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts." Id. (emphasis
added).
117. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. 2840 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 2756 (majority opinion). The Court wrote: "[tihe absence of any showing of
impracticability is particularly disturbing when considered in light of the clear and admitted failure to apply one of the most fundamental protections afforded not just by the Manual for Courts-Martial but also by the UCMJ itself- the right to be present." Id.
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Justice Rutledge rightly warned that when a government denies
due process to its enemies, it "opens the door" to denying due
process to its own citizens. 119 It is important to stress that the
UCMJ, codified after Yamashita, is controlling in this case.
Throughout history, the President has been afforded an enormous
amount of power to establish military commissions, becoming the
executor, legislator, and adjudicator all in one. 120 Congress passed
the UCMJ partly in recognition that uniformity of procedures is
critical in curbing executive abuse of power. Therefore, the
UCMJ, and not the decisions in Quirin and Yamashita, should
control the scope of the President's power to create military commissions.
As argued by Hamdan's attorney, Neal Katyal, "[Hamdan's trial
was] a military commission that [was] literally unbounded by the
laws, Constitution, and treaties of the United States."'121 Had the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Government, President
George W. Bush would have had an unprecedented arrogation of
power. As Justice Breyer remarked, Hamdan stands for the
proposition that the President does not have a "blank check" in
22
creating military commissions. 1
Hamdan may be significant in future cases questioning the limits of presidential power during times of war and national emergency.
Specifically, Hamdan may help undermine President
Bush's legal arguments for domestic wiretapping by the National
Security Agency without warrants as required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 123 Hamdan may also be important in
cases involving the Executive Branch's authorization of war-time

torture. 124
119.
120.

In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 79 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945); Ex

parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); ExparteMUlligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
121. Transcript of Oral Argument of Petitioner at 12, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006)

(No. 05-184).
122. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
123. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1978); David
Allen Jordan, Decrypting the Fourth Amendment: Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the
Enhanced Expectation of Privacy Provided by Encrypted Voice Over Internet Protocol, 47
B.C. L. REV. 505 (2006) (arguing that President Bush's domestic wiretapping program violated the Fourth Amendment); Katherine Wong, The NSA Terrorist SurveillanceProgram,
43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517 (2006) (arguing that the Authorization for Use of Military Force
did not provide the Executive Branch the proper authority to implement a secret domestic
wiretapping program).
124. See Christopher A. Britt, The Commissioning Oath and the Ethical Obligation of
Military Officers to Prevent Subordinates from Committing Acts of Torture, 19 GEO. J.
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While the Court was correct in finding that Hamdan's military
commission was in violation of the UCMJ, it erred in its reasoning
when it determined that the commission also violated the Geneva
Conventions. The Court found that Hamdan's commission was in
violation of Common Article 3 because its procedures were inconsistent with court-martial procedures. 125 The better argument is
that the military commission violated the Geneva Conventions
because it denied Hamdan a fundamental right recognized as indispensable by "civilized people" - the right to be present at
trial.126 The other procedural inconsistencies in Hamdan's trial,
such as relaxed hearsay rules and the admission of evidence that
would normally be inadmissible in a United States criminal
court,127 should have been considered individually in determining
whether they violated Common Article 3.
The Court's argument began with the assertion that the military commission's procedures were different than the procedures
of an ordinary court-martial. 128 Among other deviations, the procedures governing Hamdan's trial allowed any evidence, including
hearsay and unsworn testimony, to be admitted if it could be considered by a reasonable person to have probative value.' 29 The
Court held that, since the commission's procedures deviated from
those of an ordinary court-martial proceeding, the commission was
130
in violation of both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.
This conclusion is much too sweeping.
The language of Common Article 3 is broad; it does not require
any specific procedural guarantees.
The only requirement of
Common Article 3 is that guarantees "recognized as indispensable
by civilized people" must be afforded. 131 Instead of generally
equating the phrase "judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized people" to Article 36 of the UCMJ, the Court
should have considered each procedural deviation individually. As
Justice Alito argued, evidentiary rules vary widely across nations,
and most of the world does not follow aspects of admissibility or
LEGAL ETHICS 551 (2006); Marcy Strauss, The Lessons ofAbu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269
(2005).
125. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792.
126. Common Article 3, supra note 21, at 3320. Common Article 3 required trial "by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensableby civilized people." Id. (emphasis added).
127. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786.
128. Id. at 2790.
129. Id. at 2787.
130. Id. at 2798.
131. Common Article 3, supra note 21, at 3320.
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hearsay rules governing trial procedures within the United
States.132 Contrary to the Court's determination, variations in
evidence rules do not automatically violate Common Article 3; the
Geneva Conventions allow more latitude than that.
Justice Alito's argument falls short, however, on the issue of
Hamdan's right to be present at his trial. In denying Hamdan the
right to be present, the President did not merely alter a procedural requirement; he violated a universally recognized fundamental right. 133 The Supreme Court has recognized this fundamental right in criminal trials. 134 The Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right to be present at all
stages of a trial where "fundamental fairness might be thwarted
by his absence."'135 Regardless of whether Hamdan is entitled to
Sixth Amendment protections, he is guaranteed the right to be
present, since the Geneva Conventions also require fundamental
fairness. It is for this reason that the military commission's procedures violated the Geneva Conventions.
Finally, the plurality rightly found that conspiracy is not a war
crime. 13 6 The last time conspiracy was associated with war crimes
was in the 1945 London Charter of the Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal. 13 7 The provision, however, was quickly abandoned by the Nuremberg judges. 138 Conspiracy is not recognized
as a war crime by any international sources, as it does not satisfy
the threshold requirements of a war crime; namely that the crime
must be committed both in the theater of war and during the conflict. 139 The majority correctly found that conspiracy does not fit
those requirements, and is therefore not a war crime.
In response to Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 on October 17, 2006.140 Among other provisions,
the Military Commissions Act provides the President the authority to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Con-

132. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798 (Alito, J., dissenting).
133. See Steven Kiernan, Extradition of a Convicted Killer: The Ira Einhorn Case, 24
SUFFOLK TRANSNAVL L. REV. 353, 382 (2001) (stating that the European Convention has
declared an individual's right to be present at trial a fundamental right).
134. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975).
135. Faretta,422 U.S. at 816.
136. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2785 (plurality opinion).
137. George P. Fletcher, The Hamdan Case and Conspiracy as a War Crime: A New
Beginning for InternationalLaw in the U.S., 4 J. INTL CRIM. JUST. 442, 445 (2006).
138. Id.
139. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777 (plurality opinion),
140. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
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ventions. 14 1 The Act also denies alien unlawful combatants the
ability to invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights. 142
Additionally, the Act prohibits "grave breaches" of the Geneva
Conventions, which it defines to include acts such as torture, rape,
biological experiments, and cruel and inhuman treatment. 143
The Act requires that a defendant being tried by a military
commission have access to any evidence given to a jury. 144 The
Act also allows hearsay evidence. 145 Finally, the Act suspends the
writ of habeas corpus for unlawful enemy combatants protesting
46
arrest or detainment. 1
What impact the Military Commissions Act will have on the
precedential value of Hamdan is up for debate. It is likely that
certain provisions of the Act, specifically those granting the President sole authority to interpret the Geneva Conventions and suspending habeas corpus relief for aliens detained at Guantanamo
Bay, will be deemed unconstitutional in future cases.
Hamdan is not just a decision regarding the fate of Guantanamo Bay detainees; it impacts the scope of executive war powers, the integrity of international treaties, and the definition of
war crimes. Justice Rutledge's concluding remark in his dissent
in Yamashita is worth repeating: "[h]e that would make his own
liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if
he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to
himself." 147 Hamdan brings the United States one step closer to
securing its own liberty during an unprecedented war against a
state-less enemy.
Jessica C. Thlly

141. Id. § 6(a)(3)(A).
142. Id. § 948(b)(g).
143. Id. § 6(d)(1).
144. Id. § 949(j).
145. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 949(a), 120 Stat. 2600,
2608 (2006).
146. Id. § 7(e)(1).
147. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 81 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).

